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In 1935, after years of unofficial visits and discussions, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
International Health Division (IHD) was at last formally invited by the Cuban government to 
participate in a cooperative project on the island. The IHD anticipated a fruitful endeavor based 
on their optimistic interpretations of the changes taking place in the Cuban political landscape 
and in the official sanitation branch: “We believe that a real renaissance in public health work 
generally is taking place in Cuba, manifested by the real interest shown by public health officials 
in improving and enlargening [sic] their Services and by the active desire of the public generally 
for health work.”1 Seven years later, despite the success of its two cooperative projects (of all the 
IHD’s local health units, the one launched in Cuba was deemed “the best in the Americas”2), the 
IHD saw no hope for future effective ventures and transferred their local representative from 
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Cuba to another post in Latin America. On his departure, he commented that working in Cuba 
was “the hardest job [he] ever had.”3  
This paradox is central to the narrative of the IHD’s efforts in Cuba: the renowned 
success, even beyond national borders, of the IHD’s Cuban projects took place in a national 
context that posed great obstacles to IHD and Cuban public health officials pushing for wider 
public health reform. In an effort to reconstruct this account, I conducted research for my 
dissertation at the Rockefeller Archive Center from May 12 – June 6, 2014. Although I consulted 
a wide range of sources, I found the information in the officer diaries (mostly in RG 12, but I 
also found a relevant diary in RG 1.1, Series 420) and in the routine reports (RG 5, Series 2) to 
be the most useful. The former provided a more “off-the-record,” colorful commentary on events 
within Cuba; the latter not only provided the official annual and semi-annual reports, with 
corresponding statistics, but also allowed for a comparison between what IHD representatives 
were saying “privately” (through the diaries) and what was being communicated publically. The 
information found in the regional series (420-Caribbean) was much more useful than the 
country-specific sources (315-Cuba).  
While my dissertation is primarily focused on the issue of tuberculosis in Cuba from the 
late 1920s through the 1950s and the efforts of the state to extend effective and efficient 
tuberculosis health services to its citizens, I am also interested in (a) the wider public health 
structure in Cuba beyond the state-run Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis (National Tuberculosis 
Council), and (b) the role of international influence and transnational actors in Cuba’s national 
public health sector. I previously gathered documents published by the Cuban state, press, and 
medical class at the National Library of Medicine (Bethesda, MD); the Library of Congress 
(Washington, D.C.); the Cuban Heritage Collection at the University of Miami (Coral Gables, 
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FL); the Archivo Nacional de la República de Cuba (Havana, Cuba); the Biblioteca Nacional de 
Cuba “José Martí” (Havana, Cuba); the Museo de Historia de las Ciencias en Cuba “Carlos J. 
Finlay” (Havana, Cuba); and the Archivo de la Oficina del Historiador del Ministerio de Salud 
Pública (Havana, Cuba). The documents held at the RAC provide an invaluable complement and 
counterpoint to these Cuban-authored sources. After perusing the sources from the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s IHD, I suggest—as other historians in the last ten years have emphasized—that the 
outcome of the IHD’s projects in Cuba were heavily mediated by local and national factors, 
despite any overarching strategy of the International Health Division in New York.
4
 In Cuba, 
despite a more-than-adequate amount of governmental funding, a highly successful local health 
unit demonstration, and the deep esteem with which most Cubans in positions of power held the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the efforts of the IHD were not enough to uproot and reform an 
entrenched and highly politicized public health structure.  
Optimistic Beginnings 
In May 1935, IHD representative Henry P. Carr arrived in Havana to initiate the IHD’s 
first cooperative project, the Malaria Commission (MC), co-directing it with Dr. Aristides 
Fernández of Havana. Province by province, the MC planned to survey malarial incidence, 
categorize mosquito type, and then demonstrate how to control their breeding. Beyond the 
narrow issue of malaria, the IHD hoped that the success of these demonstrations and increased 
interaction with local people would result in the foundation of a model local county health unit, 
whose success would then prompt the spread of more units throughout the island, constituting a 
reorganization of an antiquated public health organization from the local level up. The local 
health unit was to focus on preventive medicine, the training of public health officials for full-
time technical work, and popular education, all judged by the IHD to be the most pressing long-
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term public health problems in Cuba in the 1930s.
5
 While both Cubans and IHD officers agreed 
that malaria was the preferred starting project, a more simple initiative before the more 
substantial local health unit venture, the two groups had differing understandings of why an 
entering wedge was necessary.
6
 Cubans highlighted political factors, while the IHD emphasized 
Cubans’ lack of knowledge about modern public health. The former felt that the political 
situation was not stable enough or primed for the launching of a local health unit, while IHD 
professionals surmised that full-time country health departments were “too foreign to Cuban 
background for real comprehension. The ground work has to be built up.”7 Contradictory 
interpretations about why Cuban public health officers required the presence of the IHD on the 
island and for what they needed their help characterized the seven-year tenure of the IHD in 
Cuba.  
Marianao, a populous suburb of Cuba’s capital, was chosen for the site of the MC’s first 
survey. It possessed both the rural characteristics that the IHD preferred and proximity to the 
center of political power. By 1937, with the malarial survey and demonstration work drawing to 
a close, it was determined that its success had readied Marianao for a model full-time health unit, 
similar to the county health department in the United States. Thus, the Marianao County Health 
Unit (Unidad Sanitaria de Marianao) (MHU) was founded with the objective of taking over the 
malaria control efforts of the MC, expanding activities to include health and education services 
(vaccinations, x-rays, etc.) and training public health men and nurses for work throughout the 
island. IHD representatives again made assumptions about the level of Cubans’ understanding of 
public health, stating that the malaria project was so successful because it led to the 
“recognition” on the part of government officials and leading citizens of the “importance of 
public health work.”8 Cuba’s great need, in the IHD’s opinion, was not the control of any one 
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disease, but for “an efficient demonstration in modern health work conducted from an 
educational standpoint.”9 The IHD, at least in their first years of work on the island, thought 
Cubans were simply unaware or uneducated about the superiority of modern, technical public 
health work.
10
  Cubans, on the other hand, commented on the need for IHD resources and their 
power—both material and symbolic—as they tried to reform their public health organization. In 
1943, Domingo Ramos communicated to Porter J. Crawford, “[A]s Colombia needs yellow fever 
work or Trinidad malaria studies, so does Cuba need most of all the stabilizing influence of the 
Rockefeller Foundation.”11 
The Marianao Health Unit was a resounding success -- locally, nationally, and 
internationally. Citizens participated heavily in its activities, civic groups throughout the island 
called for their own unidad sanitaria, and the IHD brought other Latin Americans involved in 
IHD projects to train at the unit. It was co-directed by IHD representative Carr and Dr. Pedro 
Nogueira. Unlike other governmental health units in Cuba, the staff was full-time and had been 
adequately trained, oftentimes in the US through IHD fellowships. The annual reports of the unit 
boasted a high level of interaction with the population of Marianao, both at the MHU and in 
schools and homes. The unit published a bulletin focused on hygienic education: large numbers 
were distributed in Marianao’s schools and requests came from throughout the island for copies 
of this bulletin. In four months of 1943 alone, 40,000 bulletins were distributed.  
Despite the enthusiasm for and reputation of this health unit, the IHD and its Cuban 
counterparts were continually thwarted in efforts to expand its success and launch a second 
unidad sanitaria (in contrast, the malarial survey and control demonstration was undertaken in 
every province by 1943). The operation of a unidad sanitaria necessitated that the current 
municipal health organization—the jefatura local de salubridad—be closed or merged with the 
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unidad sanitaria.
 12
 The jefaturas, even the more reputable ones, were still part-time and often 
preoccupied with tasks that the IHD believed to be the purview of the Public Works Ministry, 
such as garbage collection and street cleaning.
13
 The worst of these health centers had absent and 
inattentive jefes de salubridad, who engaged in corruption and collected a salary without 
fulfilling their duties (and were protected from losing their jobs as long as the politician who 
appointed them stayed in power).   
And, the IHD’s frustrations in Cuba went beyond the failure to establish a second health 
unit. Rockefeller Foundation men were continually baffled during their tenure in Cuba by the 
inability of the Cubans to pass and implement legislation to reform their public health structure 
and to extricate public health from politics. The IHD regional director of the Caribbean identified 
the most critical problems: failure to pass a national budget; short tenure of health ministers; the 
part-time nature of all public health positions; and, the predominance of political connection, not 
technical training, in determining appointment to public health positions. Although observations 
are not unanimous on this issue, most IHD officers noted that the amount of money available to 
public health posts was not the problem; instead, the issue was the manner in which it was 
dispensed (or pocketed). For example, in 1939, it was estimated that $0.50 per capita was spent 
on public health nationally; while this was not an extravagant amount, it should have been 
enough, for the MHU was running effectively on $0.30 per capita.
14
 In discussions for a 
proposed second health unit in Santiago, the IHD representative reported that 92,000 pesos were 
appropriated to Santiago’s jefatura de salubridad; only one-third of this was needed for health, 
and the remaining two-thirds could go towards drainage and sanitation. He wrote, “There is no 
lack of funds for health work in places like that city.”15 
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By 1941, after six years of hoping and working towards national and local public health 
reform, the IHD prepared to turn over the MC and MHU to the Cuban government by the next 
year. They quietly communicated to their Cuban liaisons that without any real change in the 
Health Ministry, acceptance of new projects would not be approved in New York. News that the 
IHD was leaving Cuba prompted an outburst of criticism and anxiety amongst Cuban politicians 
and citizens. In a rash of articles, the national and local press lambasted the Cuban government 
for failing to do their part to keep the IHD pleased with Cuban progress. Senators and ministers 
visited the IHD regional office in Havana, begging to know who was to blame and what could be 
done to keep a representative assigned to the island. In Marianao, civic organizations and citizens 
came together to protest their withdrawal. Cubans employed in cooperative projects worried 
about their future employment stability and some sought new jobs in anticipation of being 
replaced by more politically connected men. Key Cuban public health players lamented that all 
the advances achieved in their sector over the last six years were certain to fall apart. They 
argued that the reputation of the IHD – more than actual money or projects – was essential as 
they tried to launch national reforms. Cubans needed the political capital of the IHD men, who 
were viewed roundly as non-political and non-corrupt, to successfully lobby Congress and the 
President for radical change. In 1941, Rolla B. Hill, the new IHD representative to Cuba, 
summarized, “At times during the past six years, the Foundation has been almost the only stable 
force in the Health Department, and the value of this contribution, among others we have made, 
cannot be overestimated.”16 
Despite many declarations of Cuba’s dependence on the IHD for alleviating their health 
problems, the IHD remained firm in their intention not to start any new cooperative projects. 
Publically, they disputed rumors that they were “leaving”: the regional office was staying in 
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Havana (although there would be no IHD representative assigned to Cuba), and they were simply 
conducting business as usual, turning over cooperative projects to the host government. 
Privately, their letters and diary entries revealed great frustration over the Cuban situation and 
behavior of government officials. While the current health minister, a friend of the IHD, had a 
plan for full-time health units hanging on his office wall, there was not enough chance of 
change:
17
 Cuba desperately needed to “pu[t] the local house in order,” before any outside agency, 
including the IHD, could be of any use in permanent change.
18
 To yet another new health 
minister in June 1942, Hill penned, “Any aid by a private organization can only be relatively 
small. In the final analysis, it is the people, their government and the technical men who must 
have the responsibility for their own health and their own institutions.”19 Although the IHD 
maintained its regional office in Havana until the late 1940s, there were no new cooperative 
projects in Cuba for the remainder of the IHD’s existence. Although small public health 
advances had been made and the MHU was still running effectively and efficiently, the goal of 
establishing a modern public health organization had not been reached. Success had been 
achieved only in a narrow sense.  
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the same problems identified by the IHD officers 
continued to plague the Cuban public health structure. Every several years, the Cubans courted 
the “moral support” of the Rockefeller Foundation in attempting to reform the public health 
structure, but the IHD declined any formal involvement in Cuba, still not seeing any likelihood 
of long-lasting change.
20
 In 1947, one of Cuba’s former IHD representatives gloomily 
concluded, “It is unfortunate that a country with the resources and possibilities of Cuba should be 
so corrupt and contented.”21 
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